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 ABSTRACT 
OPTIMAL MARGINS AND PRICE LIMITS FOR FUTURES 
CONTRACTS 
 
Altay Emre Poyraz 
M.S. in Industrial Engineering 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. M. Murat Fadıloğlu 
August 2008 
 
Along with price limits, the margin mechanism ensures the integrity of futures 
markets. Exchanges face a trade-off between setting higher margin levels to 
protect the market from possible defaults and setting lower margin levels to 
make the market attractive to customers. In this thesis we develop a model to 
determine optimal margins and price limits for futures contracts, which 
minimizes the liquidity and margin costs to the traders while protecting the 
market from disruptions. Our model allows asymmetry between upper and 
lower price limits consequently between margins for long and short positions. 
We also provide a model, which is valid in the absence of price limits, to 
determine optimal margins and compare it with our previous model with price 
limits. The suggested model is applied to canola futures contract traded in 
Winnipeg Commodity Exchange (WCE) and comparable results to actual 
margin levels imposed by the exchange are obtained. 
 
Keywords: Margin setting, price limits, futures markets, censored 
observations, GARCH estimation  
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 ÖZET 
VADELİ İŞLEM PİYASALARI İÇİN EN İYİ MARJLAR VE FİYAT 
SINIRLARI 
 
Altay Emre Poyraz 
Endüstri Mühendisliği, Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. M. Murat Fadıloğlu 
Ağustos 2008 
 
Vadeli işlem piyasaları olası kredi riskine karşı kendilerini fiyat limitleri ve 
marj mekanizması yoluyla korurlar. Borsalar kredi riskini en aza indirmek için 
yüksek marjlar belirleyebilirler, ancak bu durum yükselen maliyetler ile 
birlikte bu piyasalarda işlem yapan yatırımcı sayısını azaltan bir etki 
yaratabilir. Bu tezde yatırımcıların likidite ve marj maliyetlerini enküçülten ve 
aynı zamanda piyasayı taahhütlerin yerine getirilmemesi durumuna karşı 
koruyan bir model geliştirilmiştir. Modelimizde aşağı ve yukarı fiyat sınırları 
ve dolayısıyla da kontrattaki her iki tarafın marj miktarları arasında 
bakışımsızlık olması da hesaba katılmıştır. Ayrıca eniyi marjları belirlemek 
için fiyat sınırları olmadığı durumlarda geçerli olan bir model de geliştirilmiş 
ve bu model daha önceki fiyat sınırlı modelle kıyaslanmıştır. Önerilen model 
Winnipeg Mal Borsası’nda işlem gören kanola vadeli işlem kontratına 
uygulanmış ve yürürlükte olan gerçek marj seviyeleriyle kıyaslanabilir marjlar 
elde edilmiştir. 
  
Anahtar sözcükler: Marj belirleme, fiyat sınırları, vadeli işlem piyasaları, 
sansürlenmiş gözlemler, Ardışık Bağlanımlı Koşullu Değişen Varyans 
(ABKDV) tahmini 
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C h a p t e r  1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
In future contracts, two parties, namely short and long positions, agree to 
trade an asset in the future for a certain price and delivery conditions. 
However, exchanges specifically the clearinghouse bears the credit risk due 
to a default by one of the parties. In an attempt to control for the default risk 
margin mechanism is imposed.  
 
Although there are exceptions like crude oil and gold, exchanges usually set 
daily price limits for future contracts. Price limits are mechanisms that aim to 
restrict extreme movements in the market. In addition, these limits may serve 
as partial substitutes for margins by reducing the margin requirements 
(Brennan, 1986; Chou et al., 2000). Once a futures price hits the daily price 
limit, trading ceases and there can be no trading at any higher price until the 
next trading day. 
 
Determining price limits and setting margin levels for futures contracts are 
important problems for exchanges. Setting high margin levels can provide 
safety by minimizing the risk of default, which occurs when the futures price 
change exceeds margin deposited by the trader and margin call is not 
fulfilled by him, but it results in a decrease in the volume of the traded 
contracts. On the other hand, setting lower margin levels increases the 
1 
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attraction to the exchange by traders. In addition to margins, setting price 
limits is also a problem, because when the price of a contract hits the price 
limit then trading ceases and price limits become effective barriers for 
traders.  
 
In this thesis we develop a model to find optimal margins and price limits 
for futures contracts, while minimizing the cost to the traders and at the same 
time providing protection to the market against default risk. Our model is 
specifically based on the works of Brennan (1986) and Shanker and 
Balakrishnan (2005). 
 
According to Brennan (1986) an efficient contract minimizes the total cost 
for market participants. Therefore, he develops a theoretical model that 
minimizes these costs, which includes the opportunity cost of margin, cost of 
the limit that arises when a limit move occurs and cost of reneging. Cost of 
the limit and cost of reneging are not measurable costs, so instead of solving 
his model, Brennan makes an analysis of the model for various margins and 
price limits. Reneging can occur when the trader believes that the change in 
the futures price exceeds his margin. Setting price limits can reduce the risk 
of reneging, because price limits constrain the information available to the 
trader. Since the trader cannot see the actual price, he is not sure about how 
much the change in the future price will exceed his margin. As a result, the 
trader’s decision is based on the conditional expected loss when price limit is 
hit. Brennan also argues the ‘self-enforcing’ property, under which the 
parties of the contract obey its terms and he denotes that a contract can be 
made ‘self-enforcing’ by setting margin and price limits such that when price 
limit is hit the expected loss of the trader is below or equal to the trader’s 
margin level. 
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 Shanker and Balakrishnan (2005) extend the model of Brennan; however 
they exclude the non-measurable costs like cost of the limit and cost of 
reneging; instead they minimize only the opportunity cost of margin and 
capital contribution of the trader, which makes their model more applicable. 
Like Brennan they assume that “the optimal contract is self-enforcing” and 
formalize their model accordingly. On the other hand, different from 
Brennan they control the liquidity cost (i.e. cost of hitting price limit) by 
restricting the probability of hitting price limit by a desired value. Since the 
prices of the market can move only within certain limits the whole series of 
the prices has a censored distribution. In order to overcome the effects of 
censoring they use a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic 
(GARCH) model as well as maximum likelihood methods. They apply their 
model to the canola futures contract traded in Winnipeg Commodity 
Exchange (WCE) for two periods; the first of which extends from January 3, 
1995 to December 31, 1997 and the second extends from January 4, 1999 to 
December 31, 2001 and they estimate daily margins, capital contributions 
and price limits for these two periods. 
 
We extend the models of Brennan (1986) and Shanker and Balakrishnan 
(2005) by quantifying the liquidity cost for traders in long and short 
positions and estimating asymmetric margins and price limits if there is a 
significant difference between the up and down price movements; i.e. if the 
volatilities between up and down price movements are significantly different 
from each other. If price limit is hit, then the winning party of the contract 
cannot realize his profit above the price limit on that day. Therefore, we try 
to minimize this cost arising from hitting the price limit. Moreover, futures 
prices can behave differently in up and down movements resulting in 
different risk levels for short and long positions. Although Longin (1999) 
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states that asymmetry is not preferred by some exchanges like Chicago 
Board of Trade and London Clearing House, we think that large differences 
between up and down price movements may result in an inequality among 
market participants, when they put identical margin amounts. Thus, we treat 
long and short positions differently in order to obtain asymmetric margins 
and price limits if the difference between up and down price movements is 
significant. 
 
Our model aims to minimize the opportunity cost of the market participants 
due to margin requirement and market disruptions caused by the introduction 
of price limits. Just as Brennan (1986) and Shanker and Balakrishnan (2005), 
we assume that “an efficient contract should exhibit the self-enforcing 
property”; also like Shanker and Balakrishnan we constrain the probability of 
hitting the price limit, but instead of assigning an exact value we solve our 
model with different probability levels. We use the GARCH based algorithm 
developed by Morgan and Trevor (1999) to overcome the effects of 
censoring. We apply our model to the Canola futures contract traded in 
Winnipeg Commodity Exchange for the two periods (January 3, 1995 to 
December 31, 1997 and January 4, 1999 to December 31, 2001) used also by 
Shanker and Balakrishnan (2005) as well as a more recent third period that 
extends from January 2, 2004 to December 29, 2006 to estimate weekly 
margins and price limits for the last year of each period. We obtain results 
comparable to actual levels. Furthermore, instead of daily setting, we 
determine weekly margin levels and price limits which decreases calculation 
efforts and is easier to apply.  
 
Although price limit mechanism is crucial for self-enforcement and it acts 
as a partial substitute for margins, exchanges do not set price limits for some 
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future contracts like crude oil and gold. Therefore, we develop another 
model which is valid in the absence of price limits and compare it with our 
initial model. 
 
 The thesis is organized in seven chapters. Next chapter explains futures 
contract mechanism and gives the necessary background in order to follow 
this thesis. Chapter 3 discusses the literature; Chapter 4 and 5 present our 
model and solution methodology respectively. Chapter 6 includes 
presentation of our results for the three periods. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes 
and addresses future research directions.  
 
 
   
 
 C h a p t e r  2  
MARGIN AND PRICE LIMIT 
MECHANISMS 
 
In this section some important concepts are introduced1 to give the necessary 
background in order to follow this thesis2.   
 
A futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell an underlying asset with a 
certain price at a certain time in the future. Let us consider an airline company 
that is trying to protect itself from adverse price fluctuations in jet fuel oil and 
wants to fix the price of oil it will need for the next three months. Similarly, an 
oil company also has concerns about the fluctuating oil prices and wants to sell 
its oil in the market from a fixed price three months from now. These two 
companies can engage in a futures contract agreement through a derivatives 
exchange. The contract specifies the quality, price, quantity of oil that will be 
delivered three months from now under specified delivery conditions. Here, 
the airline company, the buyer of the underlying asset (oil), holds the long 
position and the oil company, the seller of oil, holds the short position. The 
                                                 
1 This section can be omitted by the reader who has knowledge about the futures margin and price limit 
mechanisms. 
2 See Hull (1991) for more details and examples. 
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price these companies agree to buy and sell oil via the futures contract from 
the exchange is called the futures price. 
 
If the future price increases then the airline company benefits, as the price it 
agreed to buy the oil remains below the market price at the delivery date. 
Similarly, when the futures price falls, the oil company benefits, since the 
price it agreed to sell its product is higher than the market price. 
 
In the futures contract agreement one of the parties may default on the 
contract. In order to shield the market participants from the default risk, the 
clearinghouse guarantees the counter party risk by taking the opposite side of 
each contract. However, carrying this default risk requires a protection 
mechanism and derivative exchanges use price limits and margin mechanism 
to that purpose. Margin, which is typically 5%-15% of the contract’s value, is 
simply a deposit that should be paid by the traders in order to take a position in 
a futures contract agreement, it can be seen as a collateral for expected losses. 
At the end of each trading day the gain or loss of the trader is reflected into his 
margin account. This process is called marking to market. If the amount in the 
margin account of the trader falls below the initial margin level then he 
receives a margin call to restore the amount in the account to its initial level. If 
the trader does not obey the margin call his position is closed by the exchange. 
 
To illustrate how margin mechanism works, consider an oil futures contract 
traded in an exchange. Suppose that the price of the contract is $200 per barrel 
of oil and the contract size is 100 barrels. Moreover, suppose that margin is 
$1,000. Both the traders in long and short position should deposit this amount 
as margin in order to enter this oil futures contract agreement. For example, if 
the futures price drops to $198 per barrel at the end of the trading day, the 
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balance in the margin account of the long position drops to $800 and similarly 
the balance in the margin account of the trader in short position rises to 
$1,200. On the contrary, if the futures price rises to $203 per barrel at the end 
of the trading day, the balance in the margin account of the long position 
increases to $1,300 and similarly the balance in the margin account of the 
trader in short position falls to $700.  
 
After these adjustments, depending on the amount in the margin accounts, 
some traders receive a margin call. In the above example, when the price of 
the futures contract falls to $198 per barrel, then the trader in long position 
receives a margin call to restore his margin amount to $1,000, which is the 
initial margin level. Similarly, the trader in short position receives a margin 
call when the price of the futures contract rises to $203 per barrel. 
 
Derivative exchanges also impose a maintenance margin, which is below the 
initial margin level, and allow the balance in the margin account to diminish to 
that level. When the balance in the margin account hits the maintenance 
margin level the trader receives a margin call, and he needs to recover his 
margin account up to the initial margin level. 
 
Price limits are maximum allowable price changes of futures contracts. 
When the limit is hit trading ceases and no trading will be allowed until the 
next day. Following the oil example, suppose that price limits are set as $5 for 
up and down movements, which means that the price of oil futures cannot fall 
under $195 and rise above $205. Then, maximum gain or loss of a trader who 
holds one oil futures contract will be $500. 
 
   
 
 C h a p t e r  3  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Derivative exchanges face a dilemma about setting the level of margin. In 
order to attract more investors and increase the liquidity in the market, the 
margin level should be set as low as possible, however the level of margin 
should be enough to cover most of the losses that could be incurred within a 
day. Telser (1981) examines margins from an economic theory perspective 
and he discusses the reasons behind the margin mechanism and effects 
resulting from changes in the margin levels. He argues that margin is a 
mechanism that reflects the self-interest of agents who wish to protect 
themselves against losses. Moreover, he agrees that an increase in the margin 
level can reduce the liquidity of the market, due to the higher cost of trading. 
Hartzmark (1986) studies the effects of margin level on trader’s investment 
decision and shows theoretically that margin level plays an important role in 
determining the demand to the contract, contract price and volatility. He 
argues that exchanges should keep margin requirements as low as possible to 
keep market liquid. The relationship between margin level and the demand to 
the market is also studied by Ma et al. (1993). They investigate the effects of 
margin change in the silver futures markets and conclude that significant 
changes in market trading activity are associated with changes in margin 
levels.  
   
9 
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On the other hand, setting low margin levels increases the default risk. 
Figlewski (1984) works on margins requirements on stocks and equity based 
derivatives and focuses on setting margins. He develops a technique, which 
uses the mean return and volatility of security prices, the margin requirement 
and the period allowed after the margin call to calculate the probability of 
margin violation within a given number of days. Gay et al. (1986) 
contributes to Figlewski (1984) and argue that margins should be set by the 
exchange so that in a given time interval the probability of exceeding margin 
should be the same for all future contracts.  
 
Exchanges use different methods in setting margins. Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME) uses a complicated system called SPAN, which works on 
possible scenarios to determine margins. Kupiec (1994) analyzes the margins 
requirements of S&P futures under the SPAN margining system of Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange and states that SPAN margining system is more 
efficient than the strategy-based system that was applied before by the 
exchange. Bates and Craine (1999) examine the Futures Market 
Clearinghouse's default exposure during the 1987 Crash and also conclude 
that SPAN margining system introduced after the Crash in 1988 is more 
successful in setting appropriate margins compared to the previous system.  
 
Despite the methods used by the exchanges, various methods were 
developed to determine margins and price limits. Ackert and Hunter (1994) 
test a simple optimization model of daily price limits assuming that 
exchanges are operating under the criteria of minimizing the long run 
average cost. Their optimal results are equal to the average price limits 
imposed by the exchange. Fenn and Kupiec (1993) compare different margin 
policies of clearinghouses, which are designed to minimize future contract 
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costs that include margin cost, settlement cost and the cost of allowing a 
deficit to arise in a clearing member’s margin account and they argue that 
clearinghouses are not keeping in mind the cost-minimization in setting 
margins for stock-index futures. Dutt and Wein (2003) perform a simulation 
to test alternative margin setting methodologies. They state that exchanges 
should consider the preferred probability of customer account exhaustion in 
setting margins. Lam et al. (2004) compare different margin-setting 
methodologies, all of which strike a balance between setting prudential 
margin levels and minimizing the cost of margin. They test three margin-
setting methodologies, namely simple moving averages; exponentially 
weighted moving averages and GARCH approach and GARCH outperforms 
in their study. Longin (1999), Dewachter and Gielens (1999), Broussard 
(2001), Cotter (2001) and Cotter and Dowd (2006) use methods in setting 
optimal margins by using the extreme value theory. Since margins should 
cover the risks arising from extreme price changes, they focus on the tails of 
the futures price distribution. Edwards and Neftci (1988) state that in setting 
margins exchanges should consider the correlations between different 
commodities and argue that if extreme future price movements in different 
commodities are correlated then this relationship should be taken into 
account in setting margins. They find a statistically significant relationship 
between extreme price changes of different commodities. 
 
Exchanges usually set price limits for futures contracts. The price limit 
mechanism ensures that the change in future prices remains within certain 
limits and behave as partial substitutes for margins as Brennan (1986) 
argues. Moreover, Chou et al. (2000) examine the problem of “can price 
limits reduce default risk and margin requirements for a self-enforcing 
futures contract?” and find out that when traders do not receive additional 
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information, price limit can reduce the margin level. 
 
 
.   
   
 
 C h a p t e r  4  
THEORETICAL MODELS FOR 
MARGINS AND PRICE LIMITS 
 
The problem of setting optimal margins and price limits has been studied by 
various models as discussed earlier.  Our approach borrows from the works of 
Brennan (1986) and Shanker and Balakrishnan (2005). Brennan’s theoretical 
model aims to find the optimal margin that protects the exchange from 
possible defaults by minimizing the opportunity cost of margin kept in the 
account and penalizing the lost liquidity due to the price limit and reneging by 
the investor when loss exceeds the margin kept in the account. He argues that 
a futures contract should be self-enforcing and he sets up his optimization 
model to ensure self-enforcement. The model proposed by Shanker and 
Balakrishnan (2005) modifies and operationalizes Brennan’s theoretical work.  
It is not possible to estimate the costs related to the lost liquidity and reneging 
in Brennan’s model, which prohibits a practical application of the model. 
Shanker and Balakrishnan (2005) propose a modified model that ignores 
reneging and controls the liquidity costs by constraining the probability of 
hitting a price limit to a tolerable level by the exchange.  
 
 4.1. Brennan’s Model 
Brennan’s model is as follows: 
13 
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Minimize KM + γ
)~Pr(
)~Pr(
LX
LX
≤
≥
 +  (1) )),(~,~Pr(2 * MLYYLX ≥≥α
such that, 
[ ] MLXXE =>~|~  (2) 
 
Here,  is the observed futures price at time t-1; 1−tP tP
~  is the equilibrium 
futures price that would have been observed in the absence of price limits at 
time t, X~  is the random futures price change from the previous day without 
price limits ( 1
~
−− tt PP ).  M represents margin and L is the price limit.  
 
The first term in the objective function represents the opportunity cost of 
capital and K is the cost of tying a monetary unit to the margin.  Second term is 
an attempt to penalize the lost liquidity. Here γ is the unit cost for the market 
disruption ratio calculated by dividing the probability of hitting the limit to the 
probability of no limit move. The third term in the objective function refers to 
the cost of reneging. Here, Y  is the market signal, which is correlated with ~
X~ , that the trader observes.  is the critical value beyond which the 
trader reneges. The probability that the trader reneges 
(
*( , )Y L M
)),(~,~Pr( * MLYYLX ≥≥ ) is multiplied with two because of the symmetry for 
up and down price movements and this probability is also multiplied with α, 
which is the fixed cost incurred when the trader reneges.  
 
The costs related to reneging and liquidity (α and γ) cannot be directly 
estimated. As Brennan argues there is no formal theory that will help us to 
determine these costs. Brennan utilizes his model for operational purposes, but 
examines its stipulations under different settings, e.g., with external 
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information, with no external information, with uniformly distributed price 
changes, and with normally distributed price changes. 
 
The only constraint in the optimization model insures that the contract is self-
enforcing. The self-enforcing property proposed by Brennan makes certain 
that a risk-neutral trader does not have any incentive to break the contract.  
Thus, under such conditions the futures market should have to worry about 
traders not honoring the term of their contracts. The mechanism through which 
the property is ensured is as follows: when price hits the limit, the trader 
cannot be sure about how much the actual price movement exceeds his 
margin. Since the trader has limited information about the actual price change 
because of the censoring effect of the limits, a risk-neutral trader can only 
decide on whether to honor the contract according to the expected price 
movement. The main premise of self-enforcing contracts is only valid given 
that there is no additional information on the actual price, i.e., no market 
signal.  Brennan concludes that, in order for a contract to be self enforcing, 
there is one necessary and sufficient condition for each party, which is: 
 
[ ] MLPPPPE tttt ≤≤−− −− 11 ~|~  (3) 
 
for long position, and 
 
[ ] MLPPPPE tttt ≤≥−− −− 11 ~|~  (4) 
 
for short position. Pt-1 represents the price of the futures contract at time t-1 
and Pt is the uncensored futures price at time t in the absence of the price 
limits. Assuming symmetry in futures price distribution, inequalities (3) and 
(4) can be written as: 
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[ ] MLPPPPE tttt ≤>−− −− 11 ~|~  (5) 
 
Brennan argues that cases where (5) holds as a strict inequality cannot be 
optimal, so he uses (5) as equality in his model (See equation (2)). 
 
In his work, Brennan states that price limits can be partial substitutes for 
margins and they reduce the margin requirements. 
 
 4.2. Shanker and Balakrishnan’s Model 
Shanker and Balakrishnan (2005) extend the model of Brennan and make it 
operational. Their model can be illustrated as follows: 
 
Minimize kMCMkMCM LLLSSS ))(())(( +++  (6) 
subject to, 
[ ] )(~|~ 11 SSSUtttt MCMLPPPPE +=+≥− −−  (7) 
USSS LMCM >+ )(  (8) 
[ ] )(~|~ 11 LLLLtttt MCMLPPPPE +=−≤− −−  (9) 
LLLL LMCM >+ )(  (10) 
pLPPLPP LttUtt ≤−≤++≥ −− )~Pr()~Pr( 11  (11) 
 
In this model,  and  represent upper and lower price limits and 
similarly  and  represent margins deposited by a clearing firm 
regarding to short and long futures positions respectively and k is the interest 
rate. Moreover,  and  are the capital contribution by the 
UL LL
SM LM
)( SS MC )( LL MC
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clearing firm for short and long positions. This capital contribution is used to 
cover the losses arising from trader defaults when the losses exceed initial 
margin levels. Therefore capital contributions should be equal to the expected 
price change above the margin level.  
 
In the model specified above, Shanker and Balakrishnan try to minimize the 
margin and capital deposited by clearing firm for both and short positions 
simultaneously with respect to , ,  and . Since both the margin 
and the capital contribution is paid by the clearing firm and they are both used 
as collateral against the risks due to price fluctuations, there is no need to 
distinguish them from an optimization perspective.  The model would 
optimize the total amount 
LM SM UL LL
( )L L LM C M+  (and ( )S S SM C M+ ) and then the 
amount can be distributed between the margin and the capital contribution.  
This is the approach used in our own model as well as the one in Brennan 
(1986). 
 
The main rationale behind the constraints (7), (8), (9) and (10) is based on 
the ideas of Brennan regarding to self-enforcing property. As stated in the 
discussion on Brennan’s model, a self-enforcing contract requires that margin 
should be greater than the limit and when the limit is hit the expected 
difference between the uncensored futures price at time t and futures price at 
time t-1 should be equal to the margin amount.  
 
In order to make their model operational, Shanker and Balakrishnan do not 
use costs that are not easy to quantify such as cost of reneging and cost of the 
limit like Brennan does. They do not punish reneging; on the other hand 
instead of using a liquidity cost they control the liquidity by restricting the 
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total probability of exceeding the upper and lower price limits by a probability 
p. 
 
Indeed the model of Shanker and Balakrishnan allows asymmetry, however 
they solve their model as symmetric and obtain equal margins for long and 
short positions as well as equal price limits for up and down movements. The 
main rationale behind this is the assumption used for the distribution of the 
futures prices. In addition, they estimate only one conditional variance which 
is valid for both up and down price movements. 
  
Shanker and Balakrishnan apply their model to the canola futures contract 
traded in Winnipeg Commodity Exchange (WCE) for two periods, which 
extend from January 3, 1995 to December 31, 1997 and January 4, 1999 to 
December 31. They solve their model by taking p as 1% and k as daily interest 
rate on 3-month Canadian Treasury bills to determine optimal levels of daily 
margin, capital and price limits. Average values of optimal margins are higher 
in both periods, but optimal price limits are higher in period 1 but lower in 
period 2. 
 
 4.3. Model 
We propose two separate models for long and short positions instead of 
solving a unified model for both. Let ,  represent margins of long and 
short positions;  and  represent upper and lower price limits;  and  
are probabilities of hitting the lower and upper price limits respectively. Our 
models include the trader’s cost in their objective functions, while 
incorporating futures market’s concerns in the constraints.  Our model is as 
follows:  
LM SM
UL LL Lp Up
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  4.3.1. Model for Long Position 
Minimize ( ) ⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −≤⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −≤−−−+ −−+− )~Pr(~|)~( 111 LttLttLttL LPPLPPLPPEMk  
 (12) 
such that, 
[ ] LLtttt MLPPPPE ≤−≤− −− 11 ~|~  (13) 
LLtt pLPP ≤−≤ − )~Pr( 1  (14) 
LM , ≥ 0 (15) LL
 
  4.3.2. Model for Short Position 
Minimize ( ) ⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ +≤⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ +≤−−+ −−+− )~Pr(~|)~( 111 UttUttUttS LPPLPPLPPEMk  
 (16) 
such that, 
[ ] SUtttt MLPPPPE ≤+≤− −− 11 ~|~  (17) 
UUtt pLPP ≤+≤ − )~Pr( 1  (18) 
SM ,  ≥ 0 (19) UL
 
Our model possesses two important properties. The first important property 
of our model is that it allows asymmetry between long and short positions. If 
there is a significant difference between up and down price movements then 
we solve the related models stated above for long and short positions. In case 
that a significant difference is not present between up and down price 
movements then one of the models (either model for long position or model 
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for short position; does not make any difference) is solved and symmetric 
margins and price limits are obtained. Although Longin (1999) argues in his 
work that asymmetry between margins and price limits is not preferred by the 
exchanges because they think it results in inequalities among market 
participants, we think that in the case the price dynamics are different  to treat 
long and short positions equally would be a source of inequality itself. When 
there is a significant difference between up and down price movements, it 
means that the volatility measures are different. Therefore, it would be unfair 
if the same amounts of margins were paid by long and short contract owners. 
  
Second, we quantify “cost of the limit” in terms of the traders and include it 
in the objective function so that the objective function is the total cost incurred 
by the investor due to margin requirements and market disruptions caused by 
the presence of the price limits. When the futures contract hits the upper price 
limit, trading ceases and therefore the trader in long position cannot realize his 
true profit that day. In other words, the trader in long position would gain more 
than the amount of the limit if there were no limit since the unrestricted actual 
price would occur beyond the price limit. Similarly, the trader in short position 
cannot realize his true gain on a day when the price hits the lower price limit. 
The cost of disruption is the opportunity cost of not obtaining the potential 
gain on the days when price limits are exceeded.  These costs constitute the 
second terms in the objective functions of both models for long and short 
positions.  
 
As in Brennan (1986) and Shanker and Balakrishnan (2005), the opportunity 
cost of margin for both long and short positions is part of the objective 
function. In addition, putting a constraint providing M>L is redundant, 
because (13) and (17) already satisfy this requirement. Finally, like Shanker 
   
 
CHAPTER 4. THEORETICAL MODELS FOR MARGINS AND PRICE 
LIMITS 
21
and Balakrishnan we do not use cost of reneging for a couple of reasons.  First, 
under the self enforcing constraint, the investors should not have any motive 
for reneging from the contract. Secondly, this cost would be hard to quantify 
as confessed by Brennan. Finally, since our objective function consists of the 
total cost experienced by the investor, it would not be meaningful to include 
this cost which is experienced by the futures market. In the model, we also 
constrain the probability of hitting the limit by a percentage in order to control 
the liquidity and we think that determination of this percentage should be 
made by the exchange. 
 
 4.4. A Comparable Model without Price Limits 
Exchanges usually set price limits on futures contracts; however some futures 
contracts like crude oil and gold have no price limits. We develop a 
comparable model, which can be applied in the absence of price limits. This 
model can be summarized as follows: 
 
  4.4.1. Model for Long Position in the Absence of Price Limits 
Minimize  (20) LkM
subject to,  
[ ] LLtt CMPPE ≤−− +−1  (21) 
LM ,  ≥ 0 (22) LC
 
  4.4.2. Model for Short Position in the Absence of Price Limits 
Minimize  (23) SkM
subject to,  
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[ ] SStt CMPPE ≤−− +−1  (24) 
SM ,  ≥ 0 (25) SC
 
In this model, the objective is minimizing the opportunity cost of margin and 
the expected loss of exceeding margin is limited with a tolerable value (CS or 
CL), which should be determined by the exchange like the tolerable 
probabilities of the model with price limits.  
 
In the absence of price limits self-enforcement cannot be achieved since 
price changes of futures contract can exceed the margin level imposed by the 
exchange. Therefore, CS and CL can also be considered as a pool of the 
clearinghouse to backup the losses arising from defaults, when price changes 
exceed margin amounts. 
 
   
 
 C h a p t e r  5  
MODEL SPECIFICATIONS AND 
ALGORITHM 
 
Let tx~  be the uncensored return at time t and )~( txf  be the probability density 
function of the unrestricted futures return. We specify the objective function 
and the constraints in terms of  tx~  and )~( txf
3. 
 
 5.1. Objective Function 
Cost of the limit in objective functions can be rewritten for long and short 
positions respectively as: 
 
(
∫
∫
−
−
−
∞−
−
∞−
−− +−−
1
1
~)~(
~)~())~1(( 11
t
L
t
L
P
L
tt
P
L
ttttLt
xdxf
xdxfxPLP
) ∫−
−
∞−
1
~)~(
t
L
P
L
tt xdxf  (26) 
                                                 
3 For detailed explanation of rewriting the equations in terms of tx~  and )~( txf see Shanker and 
Balakrishnan (2005). 
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1
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L
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Parts after the parentheses represent probability functions in the objective 
function and after making necessary simplifications equations become 
 
∫−
−
∞−
−−−
1
~)~()~( 1
t
L
P
L
ttttL xdxfxPL  and (28) 
∫∞ −
−
+−
1
~)~()~( 1
t
U
P
L
ttttU xdxfxPL  (29) 
 
for long and short positions respectively.  
 
 5.2. Self-Enforcing Property 
Equations (13) and (17) regarding to the self enforcing property can be 
rewritten as: 
 
∫
∫
−
−
−
∞−
−
∞−
−− +−
1
1
~)~(
~)~())~1(( 11
t
L
t
L
P
L
tt
P
L
ttttt
xdxf
xdxfxPP
LM≤  (30) 
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∫
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ttttt
xdxf
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SM≤  (31) 
 
 5.3. Controlling Probability of Hitting the Limit  
Probabilities of hitting upper and lower price limits are restricted by 
probabilities  and  , which should be determined by the derivatives 
exchange as their tolerable limit. Equations (14) and (18) regarding to these 
probabilities in terms of 
Lp Up
tx~  and )~( txf  are: 
 
∫∞
−
≤
1
~)~(
t
U
P
L
Utt pxdxf  (32) 
L
P
L
tt pxdxf
t
L
≤∫−
−
∞−
1
~)~(  (33) 
 
 5.4. Estimation of the Censored Data 
We employ Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(GARCH) model4 of Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) while estimating 
volatility of future returns series. GARCH5 model is used very commonly in 
the literature as Baillie and Myers (1991) show that these models are effective 
                                                 
4 For detailed explanation see Greene (2008). 
5 For a recent literature on the use of GARCH models in commodity returns see Baillie et al. (2007). 
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in describing the distribution of future prices. GARCH model considers the 
variance of the current error term to be a function of the variances of the 
previous time period's error terms. This process can be illustrated as follows: 
   
ttR εμ +=  (34) 
22
22
2
110
2 ... ntnttt −−− ++++= εαεαεαασ  (35) 
 
Here Rt denotes the daily returns; μ  is the mean of returns, is the surprise 
component of the returns,  is the conditional variance at time t and 
tε
2
tσ
nααα ,...,, 10  are the coefficients of the variance equation, which are variables 
that need to be estimated. In GARCH process, coefficients of the conditional 
variance equation (34) are estimated by maximizing the following log-
likelihood function: 
 
 ∑ ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ ++−= T
t
t
tLLF 1 2
2
2ln)2ln(
2
1
σ
εσπ  (36) 
 
where T is the number of observations. 
 
In solving our model the conditional distribution of futures returns are 
assumed to be normal. While using GARCH framework normal distribution 
assumption about the conditional density of commodity futures returns is very 
convenient and allows for time dependent conditional variances and 
leptokurtosis in the unconditional distribution of returns as argued by Baillie 
and Myers (1991). This assumption is inline with the documented finding of 
the unconditional distribution of the commodity returns being fat-tailed and 
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leptokurtic in the literature6. Therefore, we decided to use the conditional 
normality assumption for futures returns, which is also operationally very 
convenient. 
 
In determining the margins and price limits for future contracts one of the 
main problems is the estimation of the censored data.  When prices hit the 
limit, it is not possible to observe the equilibrium prices that would have been 
prevailed. We employ the GARCH based model of Morgan and Trevor 
(1999), who use a rational expectations (RE) algorithm, which estimates the 
conditional expectations of the squares of the underlying equilibrium error 
terms, and simultaneously updates the GARCH process, to reflect the 
information on the unobserved equilibrium price revealed by the observed 
censored price. 
 
Futures return volatility might react differently to positive and negative 
surprises and exhibit asymmetric property. In order to account for this possible 
asymmetry we use the following GARCH representation proposed by Glosten, 
Jagannathan and Runkle (1993): 
 
2
3
2
2
2
10
2
1 ttttt εγασαεαασ +++=+  (37) 
 
where and  represent conditional variance and error term at time t 
respectively. 
2
tσ 2tε
0α , 1α , 2α  and 3α  are GJR-GARCH parameters. tγ  takes the 
value 1 if  and 0 otherwise.  0<tε
 
                                                 
6 Such as Stevenson and Bear (1970), Mann and Heifner (1976) and Gordon (1985).  
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In case of an asymmetry in futures return data, we evaluate different 
variances for up and down movements. For a possible up (down) price 
movement we estimate the volatility by assigning 0 (1) to tγ . Therefore we get 
two separate volatilities for up and down movements in the price while 
calculating the margins and price limits. 
    
 5.5. Our Algorithm in Determining Margins and Price Limits 
Our algorithm to determine optimal margins and price limits can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
• First, check the time series whether it has asymmetry or not by 
applying GJR-GARCH and testing the statistical significance of tγ . 
 
• Second, use the RE algorithm by Morgan and Trevor (1999) to 
estimate weekly unrestricted means and variances when asymmetry is 
detected in the data, estimations are conducted by using GJR-GARCH. 
 
• Finally, solve the related models outlined in equations 12 to 19 to 
calculate optimal margins for both long and short positions and price 
limits for up or down price movements.  
 
In order to determine the optimal margins and price limits for the first week 
of the last year of each period, the first two years data is used. Then for each 
week, the data set is expanded by one week and again the algorithm is used to 
calculate optimal margins and price limits. 
 
   
 
 C h a p t e r  6  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
 6.1. Properties of Data Used 
We use the data of the Canola futures contract which is traded in Winnipeg 
Commodity Exchange (WCE). The data is obtained from the website of 
WCE7.  Canola oil futures data is used in this study as it is available through 
the exchange and WCE imposes price limits and changes margins for this 
contract from time to time. Therefore we have the opportunity of testing our 
model in periods with different price limits and margins. The first two periods 
of this data set is also used by Shanker and Balakrishnan (2005) which gives 
us a comparison base for our model.  
 
We apply our model to three periods, first period extends from January 
3,1995 to December 31, 1997 (period 1); the second one covers the January 4, 
1999 to December 31, 2001 (period 2) and the last period is  from January 2, 
2004 to December 29, 2006 (period 3).  Futures return series are obtained from 
the prices of the futures contract, using the nearby futures contract series 
excluding the observations in the delivery month and the days with 0 trading 
volume. In period 1, the actual price limits and margins imposed by the 
                                                 
7 www.wce.ca. The website is moved to www.theice.com. 
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exchange are both $10/tonne. In period 2, until 9 October, 2000 price limit is 
$10/tonne and $30/tonne afterwards. In addition, margin is updated monthly 
by Winnipeg Commodity Exchange (WCE) and it is a percentage of the daily 
settlement price. These percentages are computed by nearest futures settlement 
price × 2 × maximum of standard deviations of daily returns of past 20, 90 and 
260 days’ of nearby contract. Price limit is $30/tonne and margins are updated  
 
TABLE 6.1: Characteristics of canola futures contract traded in WCE for 
three periods  
 
Variable 
1995/01/03-
1997/12/31 
1999/01/04-
2001/12/31 
2004/01/02-
2006/12/29 
    
Average futures settlement price($) 418.34 291.25 306.05
    
Average return(%) -0.0223 -0.0265 -0.0273
Standard deviation of return(%) 0.9656 1.0755 1.3092
    
Average margin($/tonne) 10.3590 6.5564 9.7992
Standard deviation of margin($/tonne) 1.2917 2.0586 2.2725
    
Average price limit($/tonne) 10.3590 18.2243 30.0000
Standard Deviation of price limit($/tonne) 1.2917 9.7864 NA
    
Last year of the period    
Average margin($/tonne)  10.2191 6.0716 7.7419
Standard Deviation of margin($/tonne) 1.0256 2.0092 0.2504
    
Average price limit($/tonne)  10.2191 30.0000 30.0000
Standard Deviation of price limit($/tonne) 1.0256 NA NA
    
Number of days that futures price change 15 4 0
hit the price limit in either direction       
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monthly by the exchange in period 3. Before October 9, 2000 exchange 
expanded the price limits and margins by 50% depending on the limit moves 
of the nearest future contracts on the previous day. Table 6.1 summarizes the 
statistics of canola futures contract traded in Winnipeg Commodity Exchange 
for three periods, namely 1995/01/03 –1997/12/31, 1999/01/04 – 2001/12/31 
and 2004/01/02 – 2006/12/29, and for the last years of each period. The data 
reveals that standard deviation of margin is higher in periods 2 and 3 
compared to period 1. In period 1 futures prices hit the limit 15 times and in 
period 2, the price limit is violated 4 times. On the other hand no limit move is 
observed in period 3, since price limit is constant at $30/tonne, which is a high 
price limit above the margin. Therefore, the contracts after the limit change on 
October 9, 2000 are not self enforcing. 
 
 6.2. Estimation of the Distribution Parameters 
As outlined in our algorithm the first step is estimating the unrestricted 
distribution parameters. We conduct diagnostic tests to check for the GARCH 
effects in the time series data for each period specified above. After these tests 
we decide to use the first two years’ daily return data in the estimation of 
weekly margins and price limits within the last year of each period.  For each 
week we repeat the GARCH parameter estimations by expanding the data set 
by adding the previous weeks’ return realizations. As exchanges are reluctant 
to make frequent changes on margins and price limits for operational 
purposes, we chose to estimate weekly margins and price limits. Weekly 
estimation is also more convenient as this frequency can accommodate faster 
reaction to extreme movements in the market compared to monthly updates. 
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GJR-GARCH is applied for each period in an attempt to detect asymmetry in 
the time series of returns. Weekly estimations for period 1 and 3 reveal that the 
leverage terms are statistically insignificant, thus up and down movements do 
not alter the volatility dynamics. However, in period 2 volatility dynamics are 
affected by asymmetry as the leverage terms are statistically significant after 
the 29th week of this period. Consequently, period 1, first 28 weeks of period 2 
and period 3 do not have asymmetric property, so we determine symmetric 
margins and price limits for these periods and asymmetric margins and price 
limits for the estimations after 29th week of the second period. 
 
TABLE 6.2: Averages and standard deviations of GARCH parameters for 
three periods 
 
Period/variable μt (%) α0 α1 α2 γ 
1997/01/02-1997/12/31      
Parameter      
Average 0.0050639 0.0000027 0.0482561 0.9188128 NA
Standard Deviation 0.0078146 0.0000004 0.0037652 0.0073608 NA
2001/01/02-2001/12/31  
First 28 Weeks  
Parameter  
Average -0.0007775 0.0000043 0.8664709 0.0939303 NA
Standard Deviation 0.0001429 0.0000001 0.0038137 0.0044986 NA
After 29th Week  
Parameter  
Average -0.0003920 0.0000067 0.8307471 0.1479693 -0.0777548
Standard Deviation 0.0000425 0.0000007 0.0092871 0.0074857 0.0116308
2006/01/03-2006/12/29  
Parameter  
Average -0.0447972 0.0000113 0.1302861 0.8190703 NA
Standard Deviation 0.0364354 0.0000055 0.0080955 0.0289122 NA
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We proceed to estimate the unrestricted distribution parameters of futures 
returns. Since futures prices are censored by price limits, we need to overcome 
the effects of censoring in the data. In order to do this, the GARCH based 
algorithm of Morgan and Trevor (1999) is used and MATLAB is employed to 
apply their algorithm to obtain weekly estimates of unrestricted GARCH 
parameters as well as volatilities of each period. The averages of parameter 
estimates and the standard deviations of the unrestricted estimations of each 
period are summarized in Table 6.2. In all the three periods the GARCH 
parameters are statistically significant, whereas leverage term is significant for 
the second period starting from the 29th week. 
  
 6.3. Determining Optimal Margins and Price Limits with Various 
         Tolerable Default Probabilities 
The optimal margins and price limits are determined by solving8 our model in 
equations (12) to (19) and using the unrestricted distribution parameters. 
According to our model the exchange has to decide about the tolerable 
probability of default level. In an attempt to observe the impact of the chosen 
probability on optimal margins and price limits, the model is solved for the last 
day of each period under different probability levels ranging from 0.5% to 
2.5%. In period 2, after 29th week we calculate different optimal margins for 
long and short positions and price limits for up and down moves due to the 
detected asymmetry. Figures 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 are the results of this 
exercise. As seen from the figures, when the tolerable probability increases, 
the margins and the price limits decrease as expected. Moreover, the 
difference between margin and price limit widens with increasing probability. 
                                                 
8 We use MATLAB’s fmincon nonlinear optimization function by assigning initial value 8 for both 
margin and the price limit. The termination tolerance is 10-6. 
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Bold lines in each figure represent the actual margins imposed by the 
exchange on the chosen date. In period 1 the margin imposed by the exchange 
corresponds to a tolerable probability default level of 0.15% in either up or 
down moves. In periods 2 and 3 the actual margins used by the exchange 
corresponds to a tolerable probability level of more then 2.5% in both 
directions. 
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FIGURE 6.3.1: The relationship between tolerable probability and margin; 
tolerable probability and price limit for the last day of period 1 
 
We would like to note that when asymmetry is detected in the data it might 
be important to estimate the volatilities with an asymmetric model as this 
could lead to very different optimal margin levels at each probability level for 
long and short positions as can be observed from our last day plots of period 2 
(Figures 6.3.2 and 6.3.3).      
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Margin and Price Limit for Given Probabilities (Period 2, Long Position)
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FIGURE 6.3.2: The relationship between tolerable probability and margin of 
long position; tolerable probability and lower price limit for the last day of 
period 2 
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FIGURE 6.3.3: The relationship between tolerable probability and margin of 
short position; tolerable probability and lower price limit for the last day of 
period 2 
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FIGURE 6.3.4: The relationship between tolerable probability and margin; 
tolerable probability and price limit for the last day of period 3 
 
6.4. Weekly Optimal Margins and Price Limits with Chosen Tolerable 
         Default Probabilities   
The determination of the margins and price limits heavily depends on the 
chosen probability. Instead of imposing a pre-determined default probability, 
we compute and obtain the results for tolerable probability levels of 0.5% and 
2.5% in one direction. Average weekly margins and price limits of each period 
are presented in Table 6.4.1. 
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TABLE 6.4.1: Averages of actual and optimum margins and price limits of 
canola futures contract with tolerable probabilities of 0.5% and 2.5%  
 
 
Variable   
1997/01/02-
1997/12/31 
2001/01/02-
2001/12/31 
2006/01/03-
2006/12/29 
pL = pU = 0.5%     
Long     
Optimal margin  9.5213 9.0022 8.4944
Optimal price limit  8.3106 7.9547 7.4144
Short   
Optimal margin  9.5213 9.0506 8.4944
Optimal price limit  8.3106 7.9724 7.4144
pL = pU = 2.5%   
Long   
Optimal margin  7.3688 7.1708 6.5742
Optimal price limit  5.8761 5.8968 5.2424
Short   
Optimal margin  7.3688 7.1800 6.5742
Optimal price limit  5.8761 5.8849 5.2424
Actual   
Margin  10.2191 6.0716 7.7419
Price limit  10.2191 30.0000 30.0000
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The average margins and price limits for tolerable probability levels of 0.5% 
and 2.5% in period 1 are lower then actual levels used by the exchange. In 
period 1 exchange uses a conservative margin which leads to high costs in 
terms of opportunity and liquidity. On the other hand, in period 2 optimal 
margins generated by our model are higher then actual margins. Although 
there exists a significant asymmetry between up and down movements after 
the 29th week of period 2 as discussed before, average margins of long and 
short positions are not quite different from each other. One reason behind this 
is that margins for long and short positions are the same for the first 28 weeks 
of period 2, because no asymmetry is observed in that part of the period. In an 
attempt to further investigate the other reason we calculate the differences of 
weekly margins between long and short positions for after the 29th week of 
period 2 with two tolerable probabilities (Figures 6.4.1 and 6.4.2). As can be 
observed from the figure in some weeks margins of short position are higher, 
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FIGURE 6.4.1: Optimal weekly margin differences between long and short 
positions after the 29th week of period 2 with tolerable probability of 0.5% 
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and at some weeks lower than margins of long position. At some weeks the 
difference is very small like in weeks 19 ($-0.06) and 22 ($-0.23). These 
results also leads us to the fact that asymmetry in a futures contract return 
series may not always result in significant differences between margins. In 
period 3 average margins imposed by the exchange lies between average 
optimal margins with tolerable probabilities 0.5% and 2.5%. Price limits in the 
last years of periods 2 and 3 are 30 $/tonne, which are far more then margins, 
and therefore canola futures contracts in these periods are not self-enforcing. 
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FIGURE 6.4.2: Optimal weekly margin differences between long and short 
positions after the 29th week of period 2 with tolerable probability of 2.5% 
 
After determining weekly optimal margins for long and short positions, we 
compute how much more or less a trader pays as margin by comparing our 
results with actual levels. In order to make a comparison we assume that the 
trader is either long or short in the canola futures contract and keeps his 
position for one year by switching it with the nearby contract on the last day 
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before the delivery month. Results are summarized in Table 6.4.2. In period 1, 
less margins would be paid by each trader in short and long positions if 
margins were set according to our model. On the other hand in period 2, since 
actual margin levels imposed by the exchange are lower than our optimal 
margins, traders in long and short positions would pay more compared to 
actual margins. As discussed above, the effect of asymmetry can be also seen 
in this table by observing that excess margins paid by the traders in long and 
short positions are different from each other. In addition, in period 3, if default 
probability of 2.5% was applied by the exchange traders would pay less  
  
TABLE 6.4.2: Averages of excess margins that would be paid by the traders 
if our optimal margins were applied by the exchange for three periods 
 
Variable   
1997/01/02-
1997/12/31 
2001/01/02-
2001/12/31 
2006/01/03-
2006/12/29 
     
pL = pU = 0.5%     
Long     
Total excess margin paid($/tonne) 174.67 -727.71 -165.19
Average daily excess margin paid($/tonne) 0.70 -2.92 -0.67
Short   
Total excess margin paid($/tonne) 174.67 -739.76 -165.19
Average daily excess margin paid($/tonne) 0.70 -2.97 -0.67
     
pL = pU = 2.5%   
Long   
Total excess margin paid($/tonne) 712.79 -271.70 306.18
Average daily excess margin paid($/tonne) 2.85 -1.09 1.23
Short     
Total excess margin paid($/tonne) 712.79 -273.99 306.18
Average daily excess margin paid($/tonne) 2.85 -1.10 1.23
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whereas if default probability of 0.5% was applied they would pay more then 
the actual margins. 
 
 6.5. Comparison of the Model with Price Limits and the Model in the 
        Absence of Price Limits 
In the model with price limits determination of the margins and price limits 
heavily depends on the chosen probability whereas it is acceptable expected 
loss that determines margins and price limits in the model with no price limits. 
It is no possible to make an exact comparison between the two models, since 
one is valid when price limits are applied by the exchange and the other is 
valid in the absence of price limits. Therefore we compare the main 
determinants of these two models, which are acceptable default probability in 
the model with price limits and acceptable loss in the model without price 
limits. The relationship between them is presented in Figure 6.5 below.  
 
As seen from the figure, there is a linear relationship between the tolerable 
probability level and the acceptable expected loss. 
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FIGURE 6.5: Probability of exceeding price limit p versus expected margin 
exceeding C for the last day of period 3 
 
 C h a p t e r  7  
CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis we formulated a model to determine optimal margins and price 
limits of futures contracts that minimize the margin amount and the liquidity 
cost of the traders arising from the price limit rule while ensuring that the 
contract is self-enforcing. Probability of exceeding the limit was restricted in 
our model to control liquidity and this probability should be assigned by the 
exchange. We used censored futures prices data in our model and allowed 
asymmetry between margins and price limits depending on the significance of 
the leverage effect in the futures return data. If there is a significant difference 
between the upward and downward volatilities, then the risk levels 
experienced by the traders in long and short positions are different given that 
same margins are applied for both. Therefore, we determined asymmetric 
margins and price limits depending on the conditional variances of up and 
down movements (i.e. the higher the variance the bigger are the margin and 
price limits). Apart from asymmetry, an important characteristic of our model 
is that the objective function represents only of the costs experienced by the 
traders.  Unlike Brennan’s model, there is no ambiguity of balancing elements 
of different elements in the objective function. 
 
Self-enforcement is an important property of a futures contract in our model. 
Self-enforcing property implies that margin amount should cover the expected 
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loss of the trader in case of a limit move.  This property takes care of 
protecting the futures market from reneging behavior and, thereby, allows us 
to concentrate on minimizing trader’s costs.  We show that margins should be 
greater than price limits and the difference between them depends on the 
tolerable disruption probability in that when the tolerable probability 
decreases, the gap between margin and price limit also decreases. 
 
We applied our model to Canola futures contract traded in Winnipeg 
Commodity Exchange (WCE) for three periods that are 1995-1997, 1999-
2001 and 2004-2006. We evaluated weekly optimal margins and price limits 
for the last year of each period with two tolerable default probabilities. 
Average optimal margin is lower than actual level in period 1; on the other 
hand it is higher than actual level in period 2. Moreover, actual average margin 
in period 3 lies in between the optimal margins with tolerable probabilities of 
0.5% and 2.5%. Optimal price limits in all three periods are lower than actual 
limits imposed by the exchange. In all three periods asymmetry was detected 
only after the 29th week in period 2; thus different margins for long and short 
positions as well different price limits of up and down movements were 
obtained. In addition, margins and price limits for the last day of each period 
were evaluated under different tolerable probabilities in order to observe the 
impact of the probability level. 
 
We also compared our model with an alternative model without price limits 
and found a linear relationship between the tolerable probability level of our 
model with price limits and the acceptable expected margin exceeding of the 
model in the absence of price limits. 
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Our model can be extended to quantify the cost of reneging in terms of the 
traders and including it in the objective function. Another extension may be 
examining our model under different futures price distributions other than 
normal. 
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